Europe's big tech contradiction.  CEPS Commentary, 2 April 2019 by Renda, Andrea.
 2 April 2019 
 
 
Andrea Renda is Senior Research Fellow and Head of Global Governance, Regulation, Innovation 
and the Digital Economy at CEPS and “Google Chair” for Digital Innovation at the College of Europe 
in Bruges. 
CEPS Commentaries offer concise, policy-oriented insights into topical issues in European affairs. As 
an institution, CEPS takes no official position on questions of EU policy. The views expressed are 
attributable only to the author and not to any institution with which they are associated. 
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (www.ceps.eu)  © CEPS 2019 
CEPS ▪ Place du Congrès 1 ▪ B-1000 Brussels ▪ Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 ▪ www.ceps.eu 
Europe’s big tech contradiction 
Andrea Renda 
 
hy are all the tech giants American or Chinese? Should Europe have its own 
Facebook? Why aren’t any of the top digital companies European?  
If you live in the Brussels bubble, or attend tech conferences throughout Europe, 
you will have heard these questions dozens of times. And there’s a reason: Europe has not been 
very good at raising tech giants, despite a vibrant startup environment and a fistful of very solid 
companies in this domain. Europe simply did not create any of those ‘superstar firms’ that 
economists coo over, and which largely explain the different economic performance of EU and 
US business over the past decade (as a matter of fact, excluding the so-called FAANGS, 95% of 
the most advanced US companies (part of the S&P 500) have not improved their productivity 
in the past decade).1 Already in 2016, Michael Moritz observed in the Financial Times that 
“Europe’s eight most valuable companies are only worth about 10 per cent of Facebook or 6 
per cent of Google”.2 A recent publication by the European Political Strategy Centre recalls that 
“while the EU was home to 42 ‘Fortune 100’ businesses in 2007, it boasted only 28 in 2017”, 
and “only 5 of the world’s top 100 unicorns – companies with a valuation of over 1 billion US 
dollars – are from the EU27, with the first only in 56th place”.3 Europe’s fear of lagging behind 
the US and China keeps spreading like an oil slick across public debate. Commentators point to 
several factors that would, in their opinion, explain this mounting problem: heavy regulation, 
                                                     
1 See i.a. David Autor & David Dorn & Lawrence F. Katz & Christina Patterson & John Van Reenen, 2017. “The Fall 
of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar Firms,” CEP Discussion Papers dp1482, Centre for Economic 
Performance, LSE.  
2 Michael Moritz, Europe should forget Google and investigate its own shortcomings, Financial Times, 22 April 
2016, available here.  
3 See EPSC (2019), “EU’s Industrial Policy After Siemens-Alstom”, available here. 
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lack of venture capital, lack of skills, big government, political unwillingness to complete the 
single market, and more.  
But isn’t this “big tech syndrome” paradoxical? Why would Europe want to have a Facebook or 
a Google, when regulators and trustbusters in the EU and in large member states demonise 
their size, power and business model? And how could Europe ever generate such companies, 
while cherishing and praising an approach to competition that mostly favours fragmented 
markets, market pluralism, and consumer choice? How could Europe ever become the land of 
data-driven innovation, when one of its landmark regulations pushes a “data minimisation” 
principle? And why would Europe want to build tech giants today, at a time in which two 
decades of regulation-free Internet are being questioned and revisited, and big tech’s influence 
on the political debate seems to warrant a more careful look into the once-unexplored 
workings of superstar (or ‘supernova’) firms? Why are there calls for Europe’s own Facebook 
when even Marc Zuckerberg, fearful of his own magic like the sorcerer’s apprentice, pleads for 
stricter regulation of “harmful content, election integrity, privacy and data portability” and 
beseeches governments to take a more active role?4 
Beyond the paradox, there appears to be a lack of coherence, perhaps of courage. At a time 
when tech giants are on trial even at home, Europe can regain the trust of its citizens only if it 
provides a consistent answer to this dilemma: either it tries to catch up with existing (largely, 
American) tech giants, or it builds its own model. Such a model could focus on those parts of 
the economy where Europe is stronger, such as B2B industrial platforms, rather than on 
attempts to emulate non-indigenous models. And it could also come up with a new economic 
background, more Arrovian than Schumpeterian, more Ordoliberal than Chicagoan. 
Technological developments, including distributed ledger technologies, as well as the 
‘servitization’ and ‘datification’ of the economy, make such an approach more attractive today. 
The future Single Market could thus look much more like a distributed, or even decentralised 
system in which small firms provide services in compliance with common standards and 
protocols, interacting with interconnected, interoperable administrations, and hopefully 
relying on a more mature and efficient capital market in support of sustainable 
entrepreneurship. 
Does it look likely Europe will find this courage? Currently, the emphasis is on the need for 
European champions, especially after the European Commission rejected the Alstom-Siemens 
tie-up. This decision led France and Germany to call for a reform of competition rules and even 
letting the Council overrule merger decisions when necessary.5 These two countries even 
embarked on a complex joint project to foster disruptive innovation à l’américaine by creating 
                                                     
4 See Marc Zuckerberg, “The Internet needs new rules. Let’s start in these four areas”, Washington Post, 30 March 
2019. Available here. 
5 See Chazan, G. “Germany backs French call for right to overturn EU merger decisions”, 19 February 2019, 
available here.  
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a DARPA-style agency.6 But no alternative paradigm is in sight, despite ongoing research in the 
European Commission.  
When it comes to debating alternative models for Europe’s sustainable growth, the Internet 
economy can teach us a lesson. Future winners never look like the legacy firms they have 
displaced. Market success is never achieved by doing ‘more of the same’. Playing catch-up is 
never a world-beating strategy. With elections coming and Agenda 2030 looming, perhaps 
Europe will find the courage to build its alternative vision of cyberspace. Whatever the ultimate 
‘theory of growth’ will be, it should at least be transparent and coherent, or Europe will be 
doomed to remaining prey to its big tech contradiction.  
                                                     
6 See “a JEDI to disrupt Europe”, Euractiv, 5 September 2018, here. And see https://jedi.group/.  
